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The mode of host-parasite interaction shapes coevolutionary dynamics
and the fate of host cooperation
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Antagonistic coevolution between hosts and parasites can have a major impact on host population
structures, and hence on the evolution of social traits. Using stochastic modelling techniques in the
context of bacteria-virus interactions, we investigate the impact of coevolution across a continuum
of host-parasite genetic specificity (specifically, where genotypes have the same infectivity/resistance
ranges (matching alleles, MA) to highly variable ranges (gene-for-gene, GFG)) on population genetic
structure, and on the social behaviour of the host. We find that host cooperation is more likely to
be maintained towards the MA end of the continuum, as the more frequent bottlenecks associated
with an MA-like interaction can prevent defector invasion, and can even allow migrant cooperators
to invade populations of defectors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of cooperation is an evolutionary co-
nundrum: why invest resources if the benefits of the in-
vestment are returned to other individuals? A major line
of explanation for the persistence of cooperation in the
face of non-investing ‘cheats’ is that the benefits gener-
ated by cooperators return preferentially to cooperative
individuals, as a result of non-random population struc-
ture [1–6]. Here, we extend the study of cooperation by
turning our focus to a ubiquitous driver of population
structuring: parasites.
Parasites shape host populations owing to the delete-
rious effects they have on their hosts [7, 8]. Given that
parasites rely on their hosts for resources, changes in the
host population composition will also impact upon par-
asite demography and genetic structure [9]. A tight ge-
netic interaction between hosts and pathogens can lead to
ongoing host-parasite coevolution, defined as the recipro-
cal evolution of interacting hosts and parasites [10]. The
interaction is usually antagonistic, and selects for hosts
to evolve resistance and parasites to evolve infectivity. A
key consequence of coevolution is the impact on genetic
diversity of host and parasite populations, although this
will critically depend on the type of coevolution dynam-
ics. At one extreme, coevolution follows an arms race
dynamics (ARD), with directional selection for increas-
ing resistance and infectivity, purging diversity. At the
other is fluctuating selection dynamics (FSD), where par-
asite genotypes specialize on host genotypes, potentially
resulting in the maintenance of large amounts of host and
parasite genetic diversity in time and space [11–13].
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An important determinant of coevolutionary dynam-
ics is the underlying specificity. The two most com-
mon representations of specificity are the matching al-
leles (MA) model and the gene-for-gene (GFG) model,
although other variants exist, for example [14]. MA mod-
els are based upon a system of self/non-self recognition
molecules where hosts can successfully defend against any
parasite genotype that does not match their own [15, 16].
Typical of many invertebrate immune systems, MA mod-
els assume that one parasite genotype will have a different
subset of susceptible hosts than another parasite geno-
type. Infection is therefore determined by both the host
and parasite genotypes, with such tight specificity some-
times leading to FSD [17]. The GFG model, favoured by
plant pathologists, predicts whether infection is success-
ful based on the interaction between resistance loci and
virulence loci [13, 18, 19]. GFG models are often charac-
terized by directional ARD [18, 20, 21], which can lead to
the evolution of generalist parasites [22], although if there
are costs associated with increased resistance/infectivity
ranges, FSD can also arise [13, 21].
As with coevolutionary dynamics themselves, MA and
GFG models can be understood as the two extremes of
a continuum of specificity, and the interactions between
most hosts and parasites are likely to lie somewhere be-
tween the two extremes with some degree of specializa-
tion and some generalization. Agrawal & Lively [13] in-
vestigated the dynamics of hybrid MA-GFG models via
the use of a single parameter which formed a continuum:
MA at one extreme and GFG at the other. Accurate
characterizations of specificity patterns have important
consequences for predicting the evolution of virulence
[23, 24], patterns in local adaptation [25–27] and the evo-
lution of recombination [18, 28]. Now we ask: how does
genetic specificity shape host-parasite coevolution, host
population genetic structuring and in turn, the mainte-
nance of host cooperation?
2A recent study on cooperation in a bacterial model sys-
tem highlighted that strong selection on the host popula-
tion (adaptation to the passaging environment and to an
antagonistic phage virus) allowed a primarily cooperative
host population to purge low-frequency cheats, presum-
ably owing to cooperator alleles hitchhiking on beneficial
resistance mutations [29]. Using a fully stochastic model
of host-parasite dynamics, we dissect this bacteria-phage
interaction, and extend to a coevolutionary time-scale,
spanning GFG and MA mechanisms of interaction. We
predict that the MA limit is the most favourable for the
maintenance of cooperation because of increased genetic
turnover allowing repeated purges of rare defector alleles.
II. MATERIAL AND METHODS
We follow a stochastic framework widely used in pop-
ulation dynamics [30]. Numerical simulations were per-
formed using an exact method, the Gillespie algorithm
[31]. The analysis takes place within the framework of
an ecological model of the infection of bacteria by lytic
phages, using stochastic population dynamics. The pa-
rameter values used are based on biologically realistic
values [32].
A. Simple host-parasite model
To start with, we consider a single type of host (a bac-
terium) and its parasite (a virus – in particular, a lytic
phage). The changes in the discrete numbers of bacterial
hosts nH and free-living viruses nV are due to four pro-
cesses: host birth, competition among hosts, virus death
and lysis of a bacterium by a phage (resulting in the in-
stantaneous death of the bacterium and the release of
y copies of the virus; we assume that the latent period
is negligible). They can be captured using the following
reactions:
H
b
−→ 2H , 2H
c
−→ H , V
d
−→ ∅ , H + V
p
−→ yV . (1)
From these microscopic reaction rates, we can derive
equations for the average concentrations of hosts and par-
asites (see supplementary material S1), H and V , which
follow the deterministic trajectories (in a mean-field ap-
proximation):
dH
dt
= bH
(
1−
H
b/c
)
− p V H
dV
dt
= p (y − 1)VH − d V . (2)
The system is similar to a predator-prey system [33],
differing solely in the interpretation and magnitude of the
quantity y which stands for the burst size and is of order
10-100 – while in a predator-prey system the quantity
(y− 1) would be termed ecological efficiency and takes a
value less than 1.
B. Host-parasite coevolution model
The simplest scenario that allows for host-parasite co-
evolution is that between two types of host and two types
of parasite. Using the notation of a single locus and two
alleles, we will call the hosts Ha and HA and allow for
mutations among them, and similarly for the two types
of parasite Va and VA.
Depending on the model of specificity, the infectivity
and susceptibility ranges of host and parasite (i.e. the
parameters of the four different lysis reactions that can
in principle take place) will vary. As in Agrawal & Lively
[13], we will use a single parameter q to translate across
the MA-GFG continuum (MA: q = 0, GFG: q = 1). The
parameter p represents the binding efficiency of a special-
ist virus (which can only bind to one host type) and pg
(≤ p) the binding efficiency of a generalist virus (which
can bind to two different host types). We have chosen
the form of these interactions to be a linear interpolation
from MA to GFG, as summarized in table I.
Ha HA
Va p (≡ p1) 0
VA q pg (≡ p3) q pg + (1− q) p (≡ p4)
TABLE I. Interaction parameters (lysis rates) for the four
host-parasite pairs of the coevolution model (IIB).
When q = 0 (at the MA end of the continuum),
there are two specialist host-parasite pairs: (Va, Ha) and
(VA, HA). When q = 1 (at the GFG end), one virus is
a specialist (Va can only infect Ha) but the other one is
a generalist (VA can infect both Ha and HA), albeit at
the cost of a smaller binding efficiency. From the point
of view of the hosts, HA carries a resistance allele (to
Va) and incurs in a cost of resistance in the form of a
death rate z that scales with q. Therefore, the reactions
that we must add to the ones considered in the simple
host-parasite model are
Ha
µH
←→ HA, Va
µV
←→ VA, HA
qz
−→ ∅ ,
Va +Ha
p1
−→ yVa, VA +Ha
p3
−→ yVA,
VA +HA
p4
−→ yVA . (3)
Starting from the stochastic formulation and proceed-
ing as in the previous simple host-parasite model, we can
derive the following deterministic equations for the evolu-
tion of the average concentrations of hosts and parasites
3(see supplementary material S1):
dHa
dt
= bHa
(
1−
Ha +HA
b/c
)
+ µH(HA −Ha)
−Ha(p1Va + p3VA)
dHA
dt
= bHA
(
1−
Ha +HA
b/c
)
− qzHA
−µH(HA −Ha)− p4VAHA
dVa
dt
= p1(y − 1)VaHa + µV (VA − Va)− dVa
dVA
dt
= (y − 1)VA(p3Ha + p4HA)
−µV (VA − Va)− dVA . (4)
Note that there is no direct competition between par-
asites, only an indirect one due to sharing common prey
(hosts) when q > 0. The effect of q can be interpreted
as a modification of the structure of the host-parasite
network of interactions (see supplementary material S6).
This coevolution model can in fact be taken to be a min-
imal motif within a generic host-parasite food web. The
change from q = 0 (MA) to q = 1 (GFG) corresponds
to the change from a modular to a nested network struc-
ture (diagonal and lower-triangular interaction matrices,
respectively). For a recent study about the structure of
experimental bacteria-phage networks, see Flores et al.
[34].
In our model, there is no clear time-scale separation
between the ecological and the evolutionary dynamics
(between the dynamics on and of the host-parasite net-
work). Evolutionary dynamics here refers to the muta-
tions allowed within the definition of the model (not to
the evolution of the strength of the host-parasite links i.e.
of q itself – that is left for future work). The stochastic
population dynamics will take the ecosystem through a
series of network configurations, as nodes are populated
and links activated – due to mutations – or removed –
due to extinctions. For an example of a model of com-
munity assembly and for further references, see Capita´n
& Cuesta [35].
C. Cooperation and coevolution model
We introduce a third model by adding a cooperation-
defection dilemma to the coevolution model described in
II B. Now every host has two traits: the original one (that
determines resistance to parasites) labelled by a and A,
plus a social trait labelled C for cooperators and D for
defectors. So we consider four types of host in total: Ca,
Da, CA and DA, as well as the two types of viruses Va
and VA.
We capture the social dilemma posed by the interac-
tion between cooperators and defectors by cooperators
paying a fixed cost (w), while providing benefits to every
individual in the local population, be they a cooperator
or a defector. Specifically, we include an extra birth rate
for all hosts, proportional to the fraction of cooperators
in the population (see supplementary material S1). The
reactions we must add are the cost of cooperation and
mutations in the cooperation-defection trait:
Ca
w
−→ ∅ , CA
w
−→ ∅ , Ca
µcd
←→ Da , CA
µcd
←→ DA .
(5)
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To analyse the influence of host-parasite coevolution on
the maintenance of host cooperation, we take a step-wise
approach. First, we consider the impact of host evolu-
tion on host genetic structure, in the face of a static en-
vironmental challenge (following Morgan et al. [29]). We
then introduce coevolutionary dynamics, without explicit
cooperation and defection, to explore the basic impacts
on host structure of reciprocal evolutionary antagonism.
Finally, we analyse the full model, to track the fate of
cooperation in the context of antagonistic coevolution.
A. Host evolution only
We begin by simplifying the full model (II C) by remov-
ing parasite evolution (starting with Va only and setting
µV = 0), in order to mimic the system studied in Mor-
gan et al. [29]. In agreement with Morgan et al. [29], we
find that strong selection on a non-social trait (here par-
asite resistance) generates positive frequency-dependent
selection for cooperation (see figure 1 and supplementary
material S2). The simple heuristic model in Morgan et
al. [29] offered an interpretation for this effect: because
beneficial non-social mutations are more likely to arise
in the numerically dominant cooperator population, the
cooperation allele is likely to hitchhike with these benefi-
cial mutations that sweep through the population. How-
ever, the model paid for its simplicity with a number of
stringent assumptions: no cost of cooperation, no demo-
graphic dynamics, deterministic gene frequency change
and no coevolution.
Introducing a cost of cooperation in our explicitly dy-
namical and stochastic framework illustrated that, as the
relative cost of cooperation increases, cooperators are re-
quired to be initially present at higher frequencies in or-
der for cooperation to be maintained (figure 1). When
there is no cost of cooperation, the positive frequency-
dependent effect of strong selection favours the mainte-
nance of the more common genotype (more than 50%).
As the cost of cooperation is increased, this ‘break-even’
threshold is shifted towards higher frequencies of cooper-
ators, as the intrinsic cheater advantage to defectors be-
comes increasingly important. This result aids the inter-
pretation of Morgan et al.’s experimental results, where
the break-even point ranged from about 90 per cent co-
operators (environment and phage adaptation) to about
98 per cent cooperators (environment adaptation only).
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FIG. 1. Relative fitness of cooperators across different start-
ing frequencies, for increasing cost of cooperation w (see IIIA
and supplementary material S2). Cooperators demonstrate
positive frequency-dependent selection. The curve is shifted
to the right as the cost of cooperation increases, i.e. higher
initial frequencies of cooperators are required to maintain co-
operation. Parameter values: b1 = 0.2 b0 (except in the w = 0
curve, where b1 = 0), q = 0, µV = 0, µcd = µH = 10
−5 h−1,
b0 = 1 h
−1, K = b0/c = 10
6 ml−1, p = 10−6 ml h−1, y = 50,
d = 0.2 h−1, volume = 1 ml, final time tf = 100 h, statistics
over 200 runs per parameter set. Initial conditions: Va = 10
6
ml−1, Ca +Da = 10
3 ml−1, VA = CA = DA = 0.
These biases from the purely symmetrical ‘survival of the
commonest’ result (figure 1, w = 0) reflect an increasing
cost of cooperation, relative to the presumed benefits of
adaptation to the environmental challenge.
The Morgan et al. [29] model predicted that the
frequency- dependent effect highlighted in figure 1 would
break down at low densities (as neither cooperator nor
defector lineages are likely to gain resistance) and also at
high densities (as both are likely to gain resistance, again
removing the relative advantage to either lineage). In fig-
ure 2, we revisit these predictions, and find in contrast
that the frequency-dependent effect is robustly main-
tained at higher densities. Our explicitly dynamical and
stochastic model allows resistance mutations to be sepa-
rated in time, so even if at high densities both lineages
are likely to gain a critical resistance mutation, there is
still a decisive advantage to gaining the resistance muta-
tion first – and this is more likely to be the case in the
dominant (higher frequency) lineage.
B. Host-parasite coevolution
We now turn our focus to the effects of coevolution on
the host population dynamics, first in the absence of any
host population size, K
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FIG. 2. Average relative fitness of cooperators with respect to
defectors, measured by the quantity log
10
v (see IIIA and sup-
plementary material S2), as a function of the initial fraction of
cooperators and of the host population size. The frequency-
dependent effect depicted in figure 1 breaks down at low den-
sities. In this scenario, the virus does not evolve – but hosts
may mutate to a resistant form. Parameter values are b1 = 0,
w = 0, µcd = µH = 10
−4 h−1, 1000 runs per parameter set;
other parameters and initial conditions as in figure 1.
social conflict (as described in II B). Note that the recip-
rocally antagonistic nature of the bacteria-virus interac-
tion can readily lead to instability, and loss of the pairing
in a spatially unstructured population [36]. In order for
the system to be stable (i.e. for hosts and parasites to
coexist, without global extinctions), a substantial cost of
generalism must be imposed (see supplementary material
S4), both on the resistant host and on the generalist para-
site. A cost of wider viral infectivity range is expressed in
our model in terms of a reduced binding efficiency, consis-
tent with experimental data [37] and a trade-off mecha-
nism based on antagonistic pleiotropy [38], i.e. mutations
that allow the virus to infect a broader host range trade
off against viral productivity. A cost of generalized resis-
tance is captured in our model via an intrinsic per capita
cost to the bacterial host, consistent with experimental
data [39–43].
Following the establishment of a robust coexistence
regime (see supplementary material figure S4), we turn to
an analysis of host population bottlenecks as a function
of the specificity of the genetic interaction between host
and parasite. Consistent with Agrawal & Lively [13], we
observe a reduced number of host population bottlenecks
as q is increased – i.e. moving from MA to GFG (figure
3). Underlying each bottleneck is in fact an attempt of
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FIG. 3. Host genotype substitution dynamics along the MA-
GFG continuum in the host-parasite coevolution model (see
IIB and IIIB). Number of a/A flips in a 1000 h interval; we
consider that there is a flip every time that the fraction of
type a hosts drops below 0.95. Averages and ±1 s.d. over
500 runs are shown. Parameter values: z = 0, b = 1 h−1,
K = b/c = 106 ml−1, µH = µV = 10
−5 h−1, p = 10−6 ml
h−1, pg = 0.1 p, y = 30, d = 0.2 h
−1, volume = 1 ml. Initial
conditions: Va = 10
6 ml−1, Ha = 10
2 ml−1, VA = HA = 0.
invasion by the A genotype (originated by a mutation)
into the resident a population. The structure of the host-
parasite network of interactions, fixed by the value of
q (see supplementary material S6), determines the out-
come. Invasion attempts fail repeatedly at the MA end,
as the invading HA genotype causes an explosion in its
specialist opponent VA, which in turn abruptly depletes
the HA population in a negative feedback loop (so we
observe many bottlenecks, as the a/A battle continues).
In contrast, a positive value of q stabilizes the system,
preserving a balanced polymorphism in host resistance
alleles. Indeed, at the GFG end HA manages to success-
fully invade once and then coexist with the resident Ha
due to the extra link in the network (supplementary ma-
terial S6, its virus VA is devoting part of its resources to
attack Ha too) and because the costs of generalism come
into play: the binding efficiency of VA to HA is lower;
the intrinsic growth rate of HA is also lower due to the
cost of generalism, paradoxically raising its chances of a
successful invasion. It seems that these costs of gener-
alism increase the period of the HA − VA host-parasite
oscillation, thus enabling the successful establishment of
HA (see supplementary material S7).
C. Coevolution and cooperation
We now study the full model of II C, where there is a
cooperation-defection dilemma for the hosts, as well as
host-parasite coevolution. We can now ask: what is the
fate of cooperation as we move along the host-parasite
specificity continuum from the MA (q = 0) to the GFG
(q = 1) limits?
The MA model is associated with a diversification of
both host and parasite genotypes [44] and so at first sight
is the most inimical to the preservation of cooperation,
which is typically favoured by local genetic homogeneity
[45]. However, we find that cooperation is most robust to
cheater invasion in the MA limit (figure 4). The proba-
bility of defector takeover grows with q as we move from
MA to GFG (figure 4). In other words, cooperation is
maintained for longer periods if host-parasite specificity
is MA-like. This result is robust across a large region of
parameter space (although system stability may be lim-
ited – see III B).
The non-intuitive association between diversifying
MA-type interactions and the preservation of coopera-
tion can be understood when it is recognized that the
diversifying selection is not acting on the cooperation lo-
cus, but only on the resistance locus. The result of the
continual strong alternating selection on resistance is a
continual cycle of genetic bottlenecks purging diversity
at linked loci, which here means the cooperation locus.
In the MA limit, recurrent a/A bottlenecks prevent rare
defectors from invading – so cooperation is maintained
(any DA defectors that may have arisen are wiped out,
just like the majority of CA, due to the burst in VA). On
the contrary, in the GFG limit, a single switch from a to
A hosts paves the way for subsequent defector takeover
on a static A allele background. Examples of the corre-
sponding typical time series are shown in supplementary
material figure S3.
We show that the genetic structure of host-parasite in-
teraction influences the outcome of their coevolutionary
dynamics. These dynamics in turn determine the struc-
turing of the host population via genetic bottlenecks,
which we find to be more numerous towards the MA end
of the MA-GFG continuum. Population bottlenecks are
known to influence the social behaviour of the host [46],
favouring cooperation.
D. Spatial structure
The assumption that individuals encounter one an-
other at random in well-mixed populations is made
primarily for mathematical simplicity and tractability
[47, 48]. In natural populations, however, this assump-
tion is misplaced. Biological populations are largely bro-
ken up into subpopulations linked loosely by migration
[49, 50], known as a metapopulation. Within a single
patch, cheats have a selective advantage and cooperation
inevitably breaks down [51–53]. However, in the context
of a metapopulation, cooperating demes grow to higher
densities than cheating demes, enabling cooperation to
persist across a spatially structured population [51–53].
In order to interpret our results in a metapopulation
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FIG. 4. Probability of defector takeover across the MA-GFG
continuum (MA q = 0, GFG q = 1) in the full coevolution
and cooperation model (see IIC and IIIC) for different costs
of generalism z. We plot the fraction of runs where defectors
grow to be more than 99 per cent of the initially cooperator-
only host population, within a 2000 h time window of observa-
tion and subject to non-extinction of the system (more than
85% of runs are stable in this case). Parameter values are
pg = 0.01 p, w = 0.2 h
−1, K = b0/c = 10
6 ml−1, b1 = 0.2 b0,
µV = µH = µcd = 10
−5 h−1, 1000 runs per set, other pa-
rameters as in figure 2. Initial conditions: Va = 10
6 ml−1,
Ca = 10
2 ml−1, VA = CA = Da = DA = 0. Cooperation is
maintained for longer times under a MA model of specificity.
context, we explore how the dynamics within a patch is
altered after a single migration event in a host-evolution-
only scenario (as in III A). Each combination of arriving
and resident genotype is tested, for different values of
the migrant-to-resident ratio and of the time of arrival.
See supplementary material S5 for details and figures. In
contrast to the classical invasion hierarchy between co-
operators and defectors, we find that rare cooperators
can successfully invade locally abundant defectors if they
carry the favourable resistance allele. Of course, the con-
verse also holds, defectors can readily invade cooperators
if they carry an additional resistance advantage (see sup-
plementary material figure S5). If, however, both are
susceptible, resident cooperators have a high chance of
resisting an invasion (within our observation time win-
dow) unless the migrant defectors are very numerous.
Regarding relative timings, the later the resistant mi-
grants arrive, the higher the chance that the residents
have already evolved a resistant mutation themselves –
which neutralizes the competitive advantage of the mi-
grants.
A complete study involving repeated migration and co-
evolution in a full metapopulation setting is outside the
scope of this article. We have, however, examined the
two key issues, invasion hierarchies and the longevity of
cooperator patches. In figure 4, we demonstrate how the
combination of interaction genetics and coevolution can
define the longevity of cooperator patches, in the face of
defector challenge. Specifically, we find that in the MA
limit, defector invasion is much impaired and so coop-
erator patches are able to persist for longer, increasing
the global prevalence of cooperation across a metapop-
ulation. Expanding our theoretical framework to incor-
porate more complex mechanisms of interaction (e.g. in-
verse GFG, multi-locus interactions, [14, 21]) and non-
random host-parasite interactions will present important
challenges for future work. Alongside theoretical devel-
opment, further experimental tests are vital, and also
offer important applied considerations.
E. Applied context
Our theoretical analysis has largely been grounded in
the biology of bacteria-phage interactions [29]. This in-
teraction has enormous public health interest [54], due
to the clinical importance of bacterial pathogens and the
increasing interest in the use of ‘phage therapy’ as a novel
mechanism of pathogen control [55, 56]. Supplementary
material figure S4 highlights a concern for phage ther-
apy – the administration of a lethal phage virus does not
always result in the eradication of the target bacterial
population, even in the absence of spatial structure. For
much of the parameter range, the bacterial population
evolves resistance to the phage and continues to persist,
despite the ability of the phage to co-evolve and chase
the bacteria through genotype space.
We go on to show that the nature of this coevolution-
ary persistence has great significance for the fate of bac-
terial cooperation, defining the ability of cooperators to
resist local replacement by cheats. Bacterial cooperation
typically involves the secretion of shared extracellular en-
zymes, toxins and polymers – important virulence factors
when released within a human host [45, 57]. Therefore,
the coevolutionary interaction with phages may have an
important impact on the virulence of bacterial pathogens.
In the MA limit, diversifying selection on bacterial resis-
tance alleles will pose a formidable barrier to the invasion
of cheats from rare, increasing the resistance of resident
wild-type bacteria to recently proposed mechanisms of
pathogen control via the introduction of ‘Trojan Horse’
cheater lineages [58, 59].
A recent study has demonstrated that coevolutionary
arms races between bacteria and phage decelerate over
time [43], giving way to fluctuating selection. Moreover,
bacteria-phage coevolution within natural soil commu-
nities follows an FSD [60]. These results suggests that
MA-type dynamics, characteristic of fluctuating selec-
tion, are likely to be important in determining the pheno-
typic properties of parasite and host populations. Given
the positive effect on cooperation at the MA extreme,
this highlights the potential of our model to help explain
the maintenance of cooperation in natural populations in
7a broader context.
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